Strengthening a Values and Rules-based World Order

Germany must finally “grow up”, develop into a “normal“ foreign policy actor, and learn to defend its interests: demands like these have been raised again and again since reunification, often in connection with criticism of a foreign policy that is perceived as focusing too much on values and morality.

It is true that, after 1990, the reunified Germany first had to get used to managing a wider scope for action in a world that had changed completely from one day to the next. It had to review and redefine its own interests and not only articulate them clearly but also pursue them consistently. The fact that German President Horst Köhler had to resign in 2010 because he had pointed out that a country like Germany must also be prepared to use military means in an emergency [sic!] in order to protect its interests[i], shows how difficult such a process of adjustment can sometimes be.

Despite all justified criticism of German foreign policy after reunification, the often artificially created dichotomy between supposedly tough-minded security and economic interests on the one hand, and values and morality on the other, is misleading. The historian Heinrich August Winkler prefers to speak of tangible and intangible interests [ii].

Indeed, countless examples show that, in practice, values and interests can hardly ever be separated from one another in foreign policy. What position should we take on the democracy movement in Hong Kong, given that China is the largest market for German industrial goods? Do we involve the Chinese company Huawei in the development of our communication infrastructure, if it remains unclear what risks that will entail for our free society? How do we secure the supply of natural gas from Putin’s Russia, if doing so affects the security interests of our value partners in the east? How do we organise our cooperation with Turkey, given that we share many ties and Turkey is strategically important, but at the same time is moving further and further away from common values?

Things are not made any easier by the fact that the liberal world order is currently undergoing its perhaps most serious crisis. Francis Fukuyama predicted the triumphal march of western-style, liberal democracy in the early 1990s, and yet, 30 years later, hardly any trace of this euphoria is left. For the first time in many years, the proportion of free democracies in the world is declining.[iii] The impact of the Covid 19 pandemic, man-made climate change, the flow of refugees and global terrorism are putting pressure on the West.

One crisis is following hard on the heels of the other. The euro crisis and the refugee crisis already placed considerable strain on European cohesion. The Covid pandemic is now the EU’s third major crisis in barely ten years – just after it has lost one of its most important member states, the UK.

To make matters worse, the opponents of liberal democracy, particularly China and Russia, are getting better and better at accelerating the disintegration of the West, at expanding their spheres of influence, asserting their own values all over the world and in international institutions. Against this background, strengthening, developing and, where necessary, defending a world order based on values and rules is more crucial than ever.

[i] E.g. dpa/Reuters 2010: Bundespräsident Horst Köhler tritt zurück, in: Die Zeit, 31/05/2010, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-05/koehler-ruecktritt [06/04/2020].

[ii] Winkler, Heinrich August 2019: Ein normatives Projekt in der Krise, 08/05/2019, p. 6, documented in: https://www.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/de/bereiche-und-lehrstuehle/ emeriti-ehemalige-professor_innen/gedeswestens/personen/prof-dr-heinrich- august-winkler/ein-normatives-projekt-in-der-krise_8-5.2019 [30/03/2020].

[iii] Freedom House 2020: Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, in: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_ BOOKLET_Final.pdf [29/04/2020].

If German foreign policy is to strengthen a world order based on values and rules, it must take the value dimension into account in all its decisions and properly balance it with other interests. This first of all requires engaging in an informed debate at the political and societal levels. A debate that does not artificially create a misleading dichotomy between supposedly tough-minded security and economic interests on the one hand, and values and morality on the other. A debate that makes clear that a values and rules-based world order is an essential prerequisite for almost all other German foreign policy interests or is, at least, the best way to achieve it. A debate that also addresses the question of what price we are willing to pay for strengthening a values and rules-based world order.

While Germany was always an outspoken champion of a values and rules-based world order in the past, it did not always practise what it preached. This entails the risk of foreign policy moralism[i], which is why it urgently needs to be backed up by appropriate action. This includes a stronger and more targeted engagement in international institutions, along with the necessary investment in its own defence capability and the assumption of international responsibility. It explicitly does not include proselytising other countries, with or without sword in hand. The experience of the past few decades has clearly shown that these ventures are rarely successful and that they can, at worst, provoke massive defensive reactions. We need to find an appropriate balance between solidarity with the fight for democracy all over the world, commitment to those who are politically and socially oppressed and supporting the establishment of the rule of law.

If German foreign policy seeks to strengthen a world order based on values and rules, it cannot do so on its own. It needs the support of appropriate partners, starting with the countries of the EU and the United States of America, continuing with the other partner countries in NATO but not stopping there. Especially in crisis situations, German foreign policy must look beyond Germany’s own back-yard: to the periphery of Europe, to the Middle East, to North and Sub-Saharan Africa, to Japan, to Australia, and last but not least, to Latin America.

All over the world, there are partner countries that already share our values or that are at least prepared to enter into a dialogue about those common values that should also be asserted internationally. The following chapters explain which countries could serve as partners, in which regions of the world, and what the values are that link us to them.

Peter Fischer-Bollin is head of the Analysis and Consulting Division;
Sebastian Enskat is head of “Democracy, Law and Parties” in the Analysis and Consulting Division.

[i] Cf. Lübbe, Germann 1989: Politischer Moralismus. Der triumph der Gesinnung über die Urteilskraft.

Last update: Augst 27th, 2021