Europe and North America

In the EU Member States and in dealing with its transatlantic partners, German foreign policy operates via a complex network of multilateral institutions and bilateral initiatives. To achieve its goals, Germany uses a broad range of political instruments. Since the focus of this article is on the implementation of German foreign policy with European countries and regions who are not members of the EU or NATO, the following discussion will primarily look at cooperation with these partners.

Germany’s cooperation with Switzerland is based on a dense set of agreements that is unparalleled outside the EU. It comprises several hundred international agreements, the core of which are the packages of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU, which, from the free movement of persons to free trade and cooperation in a wide range of policy areas, lay the most important foundations for German foreign policy towards Switzerland. There is also a close exchange on the shaping of common policies at various bilateral levels and by working together on multilateral bodies. With a total trading volume of around 100 billion euros, Switzerland is also Germany’s 9th most important trading partner, while Germany is Switzerland’s largest trading partner. Switzerland is also the third largest foreign direct investor in Germany, after the EU countries and the USA.

Cooperation in the Western Balkans is structured primarily by the accession processes and the stabilisation and association agreements. A framework for German foreign policy is provided by the Berlin Process in particular, a joint initiative of EU countries and the European Commission aimed at promoting the process of accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU and their eventual entry into the EU (as well as regional exchange). As far as the Eastern Partnership countries and Russia are concerned, it is currently impossible to predict, how relations will develop in the future, due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 

German foreign policy already pursues its interests in Europe and North America with a variety of means and in the most diverse bilateral and multilateral formats. Nevertheless, there is potential for further targeted development of these interests and for increasing the focus on individual countries, thus giving Germany’s foreign policy strategy a clearer profile.

In order to further exploit the potential that already exists in Europe and North America, the first step must be to define Germany’s geopolitical role more clearly and to derive interests and premises for action within the EU and in transatlantic relations from this baseline. This will result in specific actions to shape relations with other countries.

It can be assumed that the spread of Covid and the consequences it will have for Europe will again lead to increased expectations towards Germany (depending on how the crisis is managed here). The chosen path of assuming more responsibility, and of underpinning this with an appropriate security policy, for example, must be followed consistently after initial steps have been taken. This means that Germany must increasingly take a stance, explain its position in Europe and align it with its European partners. Depending on the specific interests at hand, partners outside the EU come into play, in order to defend these interests vis-a-vis non-EU members, as well as using these partners as leverage.

This vision of a more clearly defined geopolitical role for Germany must, therefore, be conceived in terms of fundamental German interests. Various starting points exist within the foreign policy network of interests discussed below which will enable a more effective use of untapped potential in Europe for German foreign policy. Depending on the potential for collaboration and the willingness to cooperate in a partner country, the form of collaboration can range from closely defined cooperation to comprehensive partnerships.

In Southeast Europe, Germany should seek closer cooperation with Serbia, with the ambition of creating peace and stability among the EU’s neighbours. Existing ethnic tensions and unresolved border issues in the Western Balkans harbour the latent danger of violent intra- and inter-state conflicts, as well as the risk of borders being re-drawn on the basis of ethnicity. External players are trying to exploit ethnic tensions; Serbia is the gateway for attempts to exert regional influence. In order to ensure that security and stability in the region are maintained, it is in Germany’s interest to strengthen Serbia’s resilience to external influences and to work towards a constructive Serbian foreign policy.

Serbia should also continue to be seen as a partner for regulating global migration flows. Germany is the main emigration destination for people from the Western Balkans, and the Balkan route continues to be a transit corridor for illegal migration from the Middle East and South Asia. It is therefore in Germany’s interest to offer people in the region economic prospects in their communities, along with opportunities for legal migration of skilled workers (while at the same time preventing illegal migration). Serbia, as the anchor country of the Western Balkans, remains an essential partner.

There is also potential for taking a closer look beyond the EU at other European countries in order to maintain prosperity via free trade and innovation. As described at the outset, the economic exchange with Switzerland is the most advanced in this context. In view of the significant trade of goods and services and high bilateral investments, no fundamental change is required. However, cooperation should be expanded in a targeted manner. There is enormous potential for this, especially with regard to digitalisation, which also needs to be pushed more aggressively in Germany.

Despite the primary focus on Switzerland’s major economic importance, the country‘s status as a partner with shared values outside of the EU and NATO should not be underestimated.. Because Switzerland sees itself as a mediator and is home to many international organisations, especially the United Nations, the country – like Germany – is committed to the rules-based international order. Switzerland is a close ally pursuing similar goals, especially in multilateral organisations, for example on the issue of WTO reform. There is certainly room here for cooperation to be developed further.

The possibilities outlined above for new or strengthened partnerships in Europe will be explored in detail below for individual countries and accompanied by detailed policy recommendations. There will be no separate article on each of the countries mentioned above. Rather, individual examples will be used to initiate a debate on expanding German foreign policy strategies.

Dr. Lars Hänsel is head of the department Europe and North America in the European and International Cooperation Division.
Philipp Dienstbier was policy advisor for Eastern Europe in the European and International Cooperation Division until April 2020.

Last update: 31 May 2022