Potenzielle Partner – und was uns mit ihnen verbindet

Europe and North America

Europe and North America are the primary points of reference for Germany's foreign policy and are the decisive – albeit not the only relevant – regions toward which all foreign policy action must be directed. The EU and the transatlantic partnership, symbolised by NATO, form the cornerstones of German foreign policy.

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Europe and North America are the primary points of reference for Germany’s foreign policy and are the decisive – albeit not the only relevant – regions toward which all foreign policy action must be directed. The EU and the transatlantic partnership, symbolised by NATO, form the cornerstones of German foreign policy.

The EU is without doubt the decisive basis for German action (and not only in terms of foreign policy). The common approach in the EU enables Germany to play a role on the global stage and to represent common European interests. The EU is also a community of values, whose members share normative ideas, along with a common history and culture. Thus, Germany has an existential interest in maintaining the EU as a functioning framework. This framework is, however, precarious. Not just Brexit, but also deep structural challenges are revealing the fragility of the EU. The coronavirus pandemic is also acting as a catalyst for the divergent realities of Northern and Southern Europe, which have existed at least since the financial crisis. Thus, continued efforts are needed to maintain and develop the EU in the face of internal and external challenges.

Transatlantic relations are and will remain another central pillar of German foreign policy. They too are based on shared values – as well as on shared interests. The shared values are based on the inviolable dignity of human beings and the freedom and responsibility of the individual. This common basis continues to exist. At the same time, the transatlantic relationship is subject to change, meaning that it needs to be redefined. This is particularly true as far as interests are concerned. The question is increasingly being asked about which specific interests actually connect Germany with the USA in particular. It wasn’t just the advent of President Trump that contributed to this situation. Differing priorities, for example with regard to Asia, have also raised the question of the extent to which the USA and Europe remain core partners. Nevertheless, Germany has no closer ties to any region of the world outside Europe.

Beyond these two pillars, however, there are other value partnerships and interest-based relations between Germany and other players in Europe that need to be explored and, where appropriate, intensified. First and foremost is Switzerland, which, due to its conception of itself as a neutral state, belongs neither to the EU nor NATO, but which, as a direct neighbour and because of its complex economic and social interdependencies with Germany, plays a special role in German foreign policy. In addition, Switzerland shares a broad set of values with Germany and therefore remains an important partner for Germany in strengthening international norms (not least in multilateral organisations), especially in times of transatlantic uncertainty, fragility within the EU, and geopolitical competition from autocratic states.

Moreover, the EU’s neighbouring countries also deserve special attention, and not just because the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe have the prospect of accession to the EU in accordance with EU treaties, this process being already well advanced, especially in the Western Balkans. There is already a vigorous, multifaceted exchange in this region, which requires continued and intensified German involvement in the course of the EU accession or pre-accession processes for the Western Balkan countries. This is true simply because the Western Balkans are geographically and culturally not on the periphery, but in the centre of Europe. The developments in this region have a direct impact on the EU, and this became particularly clear in the 2015 refugee crisis.

However, Germany, like its EU partners, also has an interest in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, which have so far been less strongly associated with the EU, and in some cases are seeking other foreign policy paths or alliances. Here, too, experience has shown that Germany and the EU will sooner or later import both positive and negative developments from their eastern neighbours, and so it is in the interests of the former to support positive transformations in the latter. At the same time, Germany must also assert itself against external players in the EU’s neighbouring countries, each of which is trying to exert its own influence.

Finally, there can be no doubt about the importance of Russia for German foreign policy. The two countries have been closely intertwined, both historically and culturally, but the developments in recent decades, and especially since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, have led to alienation that continues to grow. Russia is challenging the international order and its legal norms in many different ways, and Russia’s activities in many regions are affecting German and European interests. Without Russia, there will be no solution to the conflicts in the Middle East which are having a major impact on Europe. Russia is also playing an important role in other regions, such as the Arctic which is becoming increasingly important. It is therefore in the interests of Germany and the EU, on the one hand, to adhere to international standards and to continually persuade Russia to comply with them, and on the other hand, it is equally important to have a dialogue with Russia about balancing interests. This will work best with a coordinated EU-Russia policy. However, there are still differing approaches in the EU, which result from the different experiences and interests of the Member States and which are often exploited and deliberately reinforced by Russia.

German foreign policy operates in the EU Member States and in exchanges with its transatlantic partners via a complex network of multilateral institutions and bilateral initiatives, using a broad range of political instruments. Since the focus of this article is on the implementation of German foreign policy with European countries and regions who are not members of the EU or NATO, the following will primarily describe cooperation with these partners.

 

Germany’s cooperation with Switzerland is based on a dense set of agreements that is unparalleled outside the EU. It comprises several hundred international agreements, the core of which are the packages of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU, which, from the free movement of persons to free trade and cooperation in a wide range of policy areas, lay the most important foundations for German foreign policy towards Switzerland. There is also a close exchange on the

shaping of common policies at various bilateral levels and by working together on multilateral bodies. With a total trading volume of around 100 billion euros, Switzerland is also Germany’s 9th most important trading partner, while Germany is Switzerland’s largest trading partner. Switzerland is also the third largest foreign direct investor in Germany, after the EU countries and the USA.

Cooperation in the Western Balkans is structured primarily by the accession processes and the stabilisation and association agreements. A framework for German foreign policy is provided by the Berlin Process in particular, a joint initiative of EU countries and the European Commission aimed at promoting the process of accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU and their eventual entry into the EU (as well as regional exchange). Germany’s engagement in countries to the east of the EU is also structured primarily by a series of association process instruments and by free trade or partnership agreements. The EU Eastern Partnership initiative Europe and North America serves both as a political linchpin and a technical roadmap for implementing closer ties. However, the extent to which it can be seen as a path to EU membership is disputed both in the EU and in Germany.

In addition, the Council of Europe and the OSCE represent inclusive platforms where Germany works with its European and, to a certain extent, its transatlantic partners to coordinate cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.

The cooperation between Germany and Russia is also diverse and more intensive than with many smaller neighbouring countries in the region, and yet it is overshadowed by the Ukraine conflict and the tense relationship between NATO and Russia. This situation has led to many high-level communication channels being blocked (such as bilateral government consultations). At the same time, dialogue with Russia, within the context of the above bodies, remains important. The reduced but still significant economic exchange with Russia remains a driving force in current German-Russian cooperation: despite sanctions, Russia remains Germany’s 13th most important trading partner.

German foreign policy is thus already pursuing its interests in Europe and North America with a variety of means and in the most diverse bilateral and multilateral formats. Nevertheless, there is potential for further targeted development of these interests and for increasing the focus on individual countries, thus giving Germany’s foreign policy strategy a clearer profile.

In order to further exploit the potential that already exists in Europe and North America, the first step must be to define Germany’s geopolitical role even more clearly and, from this, to deduce interests and premises for action within the EU and in transatlantic relations. This will result in tangible measures for relations with other countries.

It can be assumed that the spread of the coronavirus and the consequences for Europe will again lead to increased expectations of Germany (depending on how the crisis is managed here). The chosen path of assuming more responsibility, and of underpinning this with security policy, for example, must be followed consistently after the initial steps have been taken. This means that Germany must increasingly take a stance, explain this stance in Europe and agree it with its European partners. Depending on the specific interests involved, partners outside the EU come into play for representing these interests with non-EU members and for using these partners as leverage.

This vision of a more clearly defined geopolitical role for Germany must, therefore, be conceived in terms of fundamental German interests. Various starting points exist within the foreign policy network of interests discussed below which will enable better use to be made of untapped potential in Europe for German foreign policy. Depending on the potential for collaboration and the willingness to cooperate in a partner country, the form of collaboration can range from closely defined cooperation to comprehensive partnerships.

In order to ensure the security and stability of Europe (with Germany preventing conflicts and promoting peace in neighbouring countries), cooperation with Belarus offers potential in Eastern Europe – a country which at first glance appears to be an unconventional cooperation partner for Germany. Nevertheless, since the Ukraine conflict, the Belarusian leadership has been promoting dialogue with international players, seeing itself as “providing regional stability” while simultaneously maintaining “situational neutrality”.

Belarusian independence is in Germany’s interest, so that a strategic balance among Europe’s neighbours can be established. At the same time, the development of cooperation with Belarus requires a sense of proportion, one that does not neglect the sometimes precarious situation of political and civil liberties and human rights in the country.

In Southeast Europe, Germany should seek greater cooperation with Serbia, with a view to creating peace and stability among the EU’s neighbours. Existing ethnic tensions and unresolved border issues in the Western Balkans harbour the latent danger of violent intra- and inter-state conflicts and the risk of revised border demarcations on the basis of ethnicity. External players are trying to exploit ethnic tensions; Serbia is the gateway for attempts to exert regional influence. In order to ensure that security and stability in the region are maintained, it is in Germany’s interest to strengthen Serbia’s resilience to external influences and to work towards a constructive Serbian foreign policy.

Serbia should also continue to be seen as a partner for regulating global migration flows. Germany is the main emigration destination for people from the Western Balkans, and the Balkan route continues to represent a transit corridor for illegal migration from the Middle East and South Asia. It is therefore in Germany’s interest to offer the region’s people local economic prospects, along with opportunities for legal migration of skilled workers (while at the same time preventing illegal migration). Serbia, as the anchor country of the Western Balkans, remains an essential partner.

The natural gas exporters Russia and Azerbaijan play a certain role in securing important resources, especially energy supplies. Most natural gas is imported, and much of this currently comes from Russia. Against the background of declining export capacities on the part of other energy partners, the country is thus becoming increasingly important for maintaining these energy imports; securing these imports is therefore in Germany’s interests. At the same time, pragmatic partnerships (such as energy cooperation with Russia) must not be strengthened at the expense of a common EU foreign policy and cooperation with transatlantic partners. Ultimately, further diversification of energy imports appears to be necessary in the light of the strong dependence on Russian gas supplies. With regard to this, opportunities could be provided by intensifying exchanges with Azerbaijan, which is a significant gas producer. As in the case of Belarus, however, given the democratic and constitutional situation in Azerbaijan, this can only be a narrowly defined expansion of cooperation.

There is also potential for taking a closer look beyond the EU at other European countries in order to maintain prosperity via free trade and innovation. As described at the outset, the economic exchange with Switzerland is the most advanced. In view of the close trade in goods and services and high bilateral investments, no fundamental change is required. However, cooperation should be expanded in a goal-oriented way. There is enormous potential for this, especially with regard to digitisation, which must also be promoted more strongly in Germany.

In addition, German foreign policy should not neglect Russia and Ukraine as potential partner countries for increased trade and economic exchange. At its peak in 2012, bilateral trade with Russia was a third higher than it is today. Rebuilding this significant economic exchange would therefore take German economic interests into account but must be weighed against foreign policy objectives (such as preventing conflicts among the EU’s neighbours). Ukraine, which is often viewed exclusively in the context of security policy, also offers potential for economic cooperation. After all, Ukraine covers the largest geographical area in Europe after Russia and possesses fertile soil, meaning that Ukrainian agriculture can become an important economic factor for German imports. As the eighth most populous country in Europe, it also offers great economic potential: on the one hand as a sales market, and on the other hand for integration into European supply chains due to its low wage costs.

Finally, German foreign policy should also take a closer look at countries such as Ukraine and Switzerland, with a view to strengthening a values and rules-based world order. On the one hand, Ukraine has committed itself to European values, which the EU should emphasise as a basis for further rapprochement. On the other hand, the basic principles of the rules-based international order were violated by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. In order to strengthen the validity and credibility of international law, it is in Germany’s interest to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and to help the country defend its claim to territorial integrity and its right to self-determination.

However, Switzerland’s status as a partner with shared values outside of the EU and NATO should not be pushed into the background by the prevailing focus on Switzerland’s great economic importance. Because Switzerland sees itself as a mediator and home to many international organisations, especially the United Nations, Switzerland – like Germany – is committed to a rules-based international order. Switzerland is a close ally pursuing similar goals, especially in multilateral organisations, for example in questions of WTO reform. There is certainly room here for cooperation to be further developed.

The possibilities outlined above for new or strengthened partnerships in Europe will be explored in detail below for individual countries and accompanied by substantive policy recommendations. This will not include each of the countries mentioned above; rather, individual examples will be used to get the ball rolling towards expanding German foreign policy strategies.

Lars Hänsel is head of “Europe and North America” in the European and International Cooperation department; Philipp Dienstbier was, until April 2020, Policy Advisor for Eastern Europe in the European and International Cooperation department.

 

 

 

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UKRAINE

As a partner for strengthening a values and rules-based world order

Since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, which violates international law, parts of the country have not been under the control of Kiev. It is in Ukraine that it will be decided what significance internationally recognised borders will have in 21st century Europe, whether territories can be unilaterally altered, and whether the right of the (militarily) stronger will again take precedence over the sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

SWITZERLAND

As a partner for safeguarding our prosperity via free trade and innovation

In many ways, Switzerland is a central partner for Germany in terms of values and interests, particularly in the area of trade and innovation. The economies of both countries are closely intertwined: Germany has been Switzerland’s most important trading partner with more than 22 percent of foreign trade. Conversely, Switzerland is also a key economic partner for Germany: in 2018, it was number 9 among Germany’s foreign trade partners (and thus the fourth largest non-EU country after the USA, China, and the United Kingdom).

BELARUS

As a partner for the security and stability of Europe, its vicinity, and of other world regions

Belarus is often perceived negatively in the West due to its deficits in terms of democracy and civil liberties. This fails to take into account that the country can be seen as an anchor of stability in terms of security policy, with its position in the centre of Central Eastern Europe, and that it has been committed to international conflict resolution for some time. Important (energy) transit and migration routes run through Belarus, which borders on three EU countries, and which, with its strong state institutions, does not have any ethnic, religious or separatist conflicts.

RUSSIA

As a partner for the securing important resources and protecting the climate

Economic growth and employment in Germany largely depend on key, energy-intensive industries, such as chemical or metal production. Despite the increasing importance of renewable energies, petroleum and natural gas – the first and second most important energy sources in Germany – play an important role for these industries.

SERBIA

As a partner for the regulating global migration flows

Serbia is of central importance for Germany in terms of regulating global migration flows. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2014, a large proportion of refugees from the Middle East, Central and South Asia have been traversing the “Balkan route”. Its main route leads from Turkey and Greece via Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Croatia which form the border of the EU. Continuing on from there is difficult because the Hungarian government in particular undertakes very rigid border controls to prevent entry without valid travel documents.