Asia and the Pacific

As already mentioned, Germany’s Asia expertise has developed over many years and covers a wide range of issues. This expertise, however, takes very different forms from one region to another and from one sector to another, and the areas of expertise are sometimes not sufficiently interlinked. Traditionally, the focus has been on East Asia, especially China. Measured by their demographic, economic, and increasingly also regional and geopolitical significance, the other Asian sub regions (including Central Asia) are still not getting enough attention from policymakers, researchers and the general public. The area was, and still is, seen primarily as a market and source of supply. The seismic geopolitical shifts associated with the revival of the traditional “great power games” in the Eurasian region were recognised too late. With the rise of China, but also with the spread of the fundamentalist currents of Islam, alternative worldviews claiming to offer a coherent ideology have emerged to compete directly with liberal social concepts for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet empire and its supporting ideology. In the case of China, this is underpinned by unprecedented economic dynamism. Its character as a “systemic competitor” European Commission 2019: EU-China – A strategic outlook, Strasbourg, p. 1, in: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china- a-strategic-outlook.pdf (18/5/2020). was completely underestimated until a few years ago. Even if the threats that endanger the rules-based international order have been more clearly perceived in Germany since the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the latest, politicians and the general public are only slowly beginning to realise the full extent of the new systemic competition. That is why German policymakers still tend to react rather than act in the face of these geopolitical shifts and alternative governance models, such as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  

With its publication, in September 2020, of the policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region, the German federal government finally, and prominently, acknowledged the geostrategic importance of the countries in the region, seeking a geographic and thematic diversification and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations. Part of the rationale for these guidelines is the self-declared expectation to play a major role in shaping the relatively new political concept of the Indo-Pacific region – not least as a response to demands from the region for a stronger German and European commitment. Established partnerships, such as with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as with Germany’s “value partners“ in the region, create a framework for more intensive cooperation: in environmental and climate protection; in matters of security, human rights and the rule of law; in expanding economic relations and free trade as well as the digital transformation; but also in culture, education and science.

Traditionally, the former colonial powers of Great Britain, France, and even the Netherlands have always maintained relations with South and Southeast Asia, even after decolonisation. Germany, on the other hand, with its limited colonial experience, is relatively unencumbered by the stain of colonialism and basically enjoys considerable goodwill. However, Germany and Europe’s definition of themselves as a soft power or normative powerCf. Niemann, Arne/Junne, Gerd 2011: Europa als normative Macht?, in: Simonis, Gerd/Elbers, Helmut (Ed.) Externe EU-Governance, Wiesbaden, pp. 103–131. which has hitherto prevailed, is less and less satisfactory from the perspective of the (partner) countries in view of changing underlying conditions and new challenges. As a result, a certain disillusionment has set in in the region in recent years due to the fact that there is often a mismatch between these normative claims and the tangible commitment of Germany and Europe on the ground and for the region. This can be attributed to the fact that a coherent Asia policy on the part of the European Commission is only discernible in some areas at best – which is also related to its different competencies, if the common foreign trade policy is compared to security and defence policy, for example.

In any event, the European partners are a long way from achieving coherence or even coordinated goals, since their own national interests (mostly in the field of foreign trade and industrial policy) still dominate. There is a threat that, with the UK’s departure from the European Union, such internal friction and the mutual damage it causes, as happened in the AUKUS context, is bound to increase. In recent years, the European Union has made progress in the area of bilateral free trade agreements. In this respect, some of the most important Asia-Pacific economies, such as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and Australia, have been integrated into a state-of-the-art trade policy rulebook. It is to be hoped that this will stimulate integration within the region and beyond to the level of global, multilateral standards. By contrast, the substantial development cooperation funds that are available are still strongly oriented towards bilateral agendas and are subject to widely different degrees of coordination in the recipient countries. Also, Asia has fallen far behind Africa in terms of development cooperation.

Europe and Germany hardly display any active security policy commitment that does not go beyond symbolic acts of military presence. The visit of the frigate “Bayern“ to Asia was the right symbol, and an important one, but it also raised expectations for a continuing German commitment. Only France and the UK are continuously visible as security policy actors in Asia. However, it is worth pointing out how limited any possible action is. Europe and Germany are neither willing nor able to become serious security policy players in the Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. As long as the joint capabilities cannot be combined in a multilateral institution, Europe cannot even make use of its limited options. Expressing a clearer commitment to regulatory principles and multilateral processes, therefore, remains an important factor. Peace, freedom and open markets in the region cannot be preserved without protecting and developing these institutions. The policy of imposing sanctions on Russia has only been partially supported in the Asia-Pacific region, which shows how vulnerable this order is. The normative power of Germany and the EU can only be brought to bear if they join together with regional allies in order to strengthen joint efforts to coordinate policies and take joint action.

In the foreseeable future, Germany should not expect things to get any easier in the traditional core areas of its foreign policy (East Central Europe, the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean and the adjacent Sahel region). Even if there is more support now for a more activist foreign policy as a result of the much-invoked new era in foreign relations (“Zeitenwende“), it remains to be seen how enduring this change will be in the medium and long term. It is still doubtful whether the new willingness to use a broader range of foreign policy instruments of power will include a necessary stronger commitment to Asia-Pacific. 

Germany and Europe will only be able to act in the region if they coordinate their actions with partners that share the same values. No Asia-Pacific strategy can be implemented without these partners or their substantial contribution. The key to a successful joint strategy will be the coordination of the different competencies. The EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy constitute a basis on which common interests can be identified and capabilities can be pooled. These strategies are the framework within which specific fields of action can be developed and can be planned so that they are compatible with each other and do not fizzle out in a vacuum. Even though cooperation with partners like Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea has been strengthened, to a greater or lesser degree, in recent years, these higher expectations must now be fulfilled 

With regard to the five German foreign policy interests defined here, this means, for the Asia-Pacific region:

a) Values

In the Asia-Pacific region, Germany’s perception of itself as a normative power encounters constitutional and social orders whose values and patterns of behaviour differ significantly from its own. This applies to government action both domestically and between countries. The number of potential partner countries that are based on liberal democratic constitutions has tended to decline in recent years, and a new authoritarianism has destroyed (at least temporarily) many democratic developments (e.g. in the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand). While the West was watching, the radical Islamist Taliban regained power in Afghanistan after 20 years. Their policies are still diametrically opposed to liberal-democratic values. However, even the like-minded countries often tend to have a “realistic” attitude towards the global system and assert their own interests. A certain amount of scepticism is therefore advisable when it comes to concerted actions against systemic competitors, such as China or the Islamist powers.

An example of this problem is the Alliance for Multilateralism, initiated by the German Foreign Ministry, which includes important countries in Asia (such as India, Singapore and Indonesia). The aim is to take concerted action, for example in dealing with the causes and consequences of climate change, sustainable development and further development and enforcement of global norms in the area of inter-state conflict resolution.

However, there is often a gulf between aspiration and reality. It is therefore imperative to also include non-state actors who, in recent years, have become increasingly influential in shaping policy in Asia. Just as in the climate debate, the way the Covid pandemic has been handled has made it clear that the view, which is widespread in Asia, that authoritarian forms of rule and certain cultural norms (“Asian values”) are superior to those of the West, is by no means correct. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, but also Australia and New Zealand, have shown that democratic institutions, and even elections, do not need to be sacrificed to effective pandemic control. On the other hand, the example of India proves that partnerships are, unfortunately, not free from instances of open disagreement, and require a firm, value-based stance on the part of Germany. The spread of Hindu nationalism in India is endangering basic secular norms and is creating considerable potential for foreign policy conflict. India‘s complex relations to Russia are viewed skeptically in Berlin. This makes non-state actors who are committed to the concept of an open society all the more important. Based on Germany’s decades-long involvement in culture, science and development aid, it can draw on a broad network of sub-state actors.

b) Prosperity

Germany’s degree of economic interconnection with the Asia-Pacific nations has increased steadily in recent decades. Around one fifth of German foreign trade is currently conducted with this region. This trade is growing and there is increasing diversification beyond the previous main import and export market of China. At the same time, Germany is the most open economy among the G7 countries and, alongside China, probably the biggest beneficiary of globalisation. Our prosperity thus depends fundamentally on fair and transparent market access regulations and an open trade architecture.

The fact that these institutions are not self-sustaining systems and that ever-closer regional and global integration should by no means be taken for granted, is reflected in particular by the persistent trade conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region and by the systematic attacks on the functioning of multinational regulations, such as those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Actors like South Korea and Taiwan are in an especially exposed position. Their high-tech industrial locations depend on being closely integrated into global supply and added-value chains. At the same time, their economies are heavily tied to China. Just like in the case of Germany, the resulting vulnerability confronts them with the challenge of strengthening the resilience of their economies. In addition to the large Northeast Asian economies, the future of a multilateral world economic system based on the principles of free trade also depends on the emerging economies of Southeast Asia (such as Vietnam or Malaysia). Regardless of their political systems, they have a strong interest in a functioning system of standards that can be enforced. Their national development interests offer the opportunity to work with Europe and Germany to develop integration into global value chains.

The Covid crisis in particular shows that turning inward is not an appropriate solution for any nation in the medium term. Rather, an intelligent diversification of supply and sales markets must be promoted in order to avoid one-sided dependencies (especially on China). The exogenous shock of the pandemic has mercilessly exposed previous structural weaknesses and provided important indications of the need and potential for modernising economies via the transfer of capital and knowledge. Not least thanks to Germany’s efforts, the EU has been able to achieve a series of bilateral free trade agreements with South Korea, Singapore, Australia and Vietnam – thus providing an important alternative model to the current new wave of protectionism. As the example of Vietnam shows, these framework agreements have an impact on the region as a whole (in this case, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN), but their effects within national economies are more significant because they force – Vietnam i being a prototype in this case – countries to make considerable adjustments, even in sensitive areas such as corruption and the rule of law. From a German perspective, it is not only a matter of improving the regulatory environment for German companies, but also of implementing progressive and global environmental and social standards.

c) Security

In recent years, the meaning of the term “security“ has become much broader, not least because of the experiences and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region: ranging from the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, ethnic-religious conflicts, conflicts over resources and religiously motivated cross-border terrorism to mass migration, caused increasingly by deteriorating environmental and climate conditions. The disruptions that will result from the Covid pandemic will have a massive impact on Germany/Europe’s established relations with the Asia-Pacific region. This has specific relevance in the debate on economic decoupling and the question of what kind of vulnerabilities societies are willing to shoulder as a price for the advantages of a global division of labour. Nevertheless, a turn towards fundamental anti-globalisation is not expected in the Asia-Pacific region. Diversification in the economic and security policy field will, however, continue to increase, which could well be an opportunity for Europe. In recent years, the focus of German and European foreign and security policy has shifted to areas that had previously been overshadowed by geopolitics. In the South and Southeast Asian region, these are countries like India and Singapore, in the Western Pacific the focus is on an arc of democratic countries stretching from South Korea to New Zealand.

Central Asia is without doubt one of these new areas in which a future global power architecture is being negotiated. This highlights the need for a new security architecture, shaped with the help of the European Union and Germany. Russia’s aggression and China’s global reach via its Belt and Road Initiative require a joint European response – in close and multidimensional coordination with partners in the region. Kazakhstan stands out as a potential partner in Central Asia. Despite a Russian-led intervention by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the country has clearly distanced itself from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The other Central Asian countries, however, are also watching closely how Germany and Europe act. To a lesser or greater degree, they are trying to stay neutral in the emerging systemic conflict. By showing a continuous commitment to the region, in terms of economic investment and development policy, Germany can support the internal reform processes. Especially Uzbekistan has the potential of developing into an anchor of stability. For this very reason, however, the options for military cooperation are limited. The region itself needs to take action against destabilisation in order to create lasting stability and security. 

Larger direct military engagement by Germany in the Asia-Pacific region– outside of multinational missions – can, however, largely be ruled out for the future.. For the foreseeable future, Germany will lack essential independent military capabilities for power-projection into these regions. However, within the framework of a broader concept of security, a number of constructive contributions can be made in cooperation with partner countries: cross-border cooperation in the field of sustainable resource use, joint initiatives in multinational organisations such as the UN, or enforcement of international standards (for example in the field of international maritime law). Security policy commitment that goes beyond this requires closer integration into European or multinational solutions on the ground. 

d) Resources and climate

Germany and Europe have committed themselves to the world’s most ambitious climate targets as part of a comprehensive sustainability strategy centered around a new understanding of resources. This aspiration is reflected in the European Commission’s Green Deal of September 2019. Although this initially had an internal focus, the political challenge is now to bring this approach to the EU’s external relations. Considering the global distribution of production and consumption of natural resources and energy, it is evident that this can only be achieved with partners in Asia; it is here that decisions are already being made about whether and how global climate policy goals, such as those of the UN Climate Conference in Paris in 2015, can be achieved. China will play a key role for the development of Asia’s and the world’s climate policy. On the one hand, the most populous country in the world is also the biggest global emitter of CO2. On the other, the country is rapidly developing and rolling out new green technologies. The People’s Republic has a complex relationship with Germany, being, at the same time, a sales market, a necessary cooperation partner in the fight against the impact of climate change and a global competitor. A lasting engagement by the German business and academic community in the country will only be possible on the basis of a guaranteed order that both sides adhere to.

All Asian countries, however, irrespective of their level of socioeconomic development, are forced to question their fossil fuel-based growth model. Negative ecological and social consequences can no longer be ignored – no matter by which political system. Energy and resource security are too crucial for the political legitimacy of the respective regimes. The decoupling from Russian resources that has been pushed, at high speed and at high cost, in Europe and Germany since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an illustration, for the Asian partners as well, of the costs of too little diversification in energy and resource supply.

In the past, a variety of cooperation networks with Germany already developed both in the public and the private sector. Germany’s enormous efforts in the context of the energy transition have made the country a coveted partner for innovation and transformation projects in and with Asia, in technological, conceptual and economic terms. Increasingly, however, we can gain important insights from the highly diverse conditions and implementation strategies in the region ourselves. This does not always have to involve only the most highly developed nations in East Asia. Windows of opportunity are opening up, especially in the emerging markets of South and Southeast Asia, where fundamental decisions are being made regarding the future energy mix or closed-loop recycling systems.

An instructive example in this context is the intensive discussion of a fundamental change in Japan’s energy policy. Being an island nation, Japan has been extremely dependent on fossil-fuel imports until now. Thanks to an efficient ecosystem of ministries, companies and scientific bodies, the country is laying the foundation for a hydrogen-based energy industry. The Japanese way of doing things is characterised by openness to technology and systemic thinking. Along with Australia, which is stepping up its hydrogen activities as well, Japan therefore has the potential of becoming the Asian export hub for hydrogen. This experience should also prompt Germany to rethink and abandon one-sided and one-dimensional transformation options. In any event, there is great demand on the part of the Japanese for transformation partnerships with German players.

Germany is well positioned in this area, across the entire range of government forms of cooperation and in terms of collaboration with private companies and research institutions. However, there is often a lack of an end-to-end value chain for fully exploiting local potential, which would also benefit Germany’s own economic interests. Small and medium-sized companies in particular, which are highly innovative in terms of technology, require active state support when entering the market and long-term financial commitment from public and state financial organisations. However, these bilateral approaches must be accompanied by closer coordination between the two countries involved in setting global environmental and climate targets.

e) Migration

Germany has committed itself to increased migration policy engagement in Africa (for example, the Marshall Plan with Africa). However, many of the reasons given for this commitment (such as creation of future prospects for young people in their home countries) also apply to large parts of West, South and Southeast Asia. West Asia is of particular importance as a major region of origin for migrants (Afghanistan, Pakistan), although Germany has so far been only slightly affected by migration flows within Asia and from Asia.

Migration pressure is the result of, but also the cause of massive interstate conflicts, conflicts over resources and human rights violations. With a view to regional stability, but also because of obligations to protect human rights, Germany has a tremendous interest in working locally with the affected countries and in cooperating with other partners (such as Japan or Australia) to find a solution to the causes of refugee movements. However, the example of Afghanistan shows how closely migration and security policy interests are intertwined. In the wake of the withdrawal of Western troops, new migration policy approaches must be developed. There should be a stronger focus on partnerships with the neighbours of countries of origin, such as Pakistan. The fact that this will produce conflicting goals among German interests in security, values and migration must not lead to inaction. Providing public security and economic prospects for young and rapidly growing populations to help them remain in their home countries are still the primary objectives of German involvement in this area. Especially in the context of fragile or non-existent statehood, players from the business community, NGOs and the scientific community need to assume responsibility for opening up development and skilling potentials for the younger generation. Most of this should be undertaken locally, but new models of temporary migration between Germany and the countries of origincan also play a part.

In addition, continued German involvement in regional and global migration initiatives remains indispensable. However, this is likely to become more difficult due to increasing protectionist and nationalist policies, especially since most Asian countries have yet to participate significantly in these initiatives – although it is already becoming apparent that new conflicts are going to develop and that the pressures from unresolved problems are going to increase in the coming years.

Germany’s voice and role in a system of flexible multilateralism can only become effective if existing partnerships with the nations of the Asia-Pacific region are expanded and, in many cases, redefined. A broad range of common themes can be addressed with countries of the democratic cosmos. However, issue-based partnerships with other countries should also be added to this list in order to solve common problems – regardless of the political and social conditions within these countries.

Peter Hefele was head of the “Asia and Pacific” section in the European and International Cooperation Division.

Last update: 10 June 2022