TUNISIA

In many respects, Tunisia plays a special role in the MENA region. As Europe’s direct neighbour, trade, migrant workers and close political relations have left a strong European imprint on Tunisian society. Secularisation and modernisation have shaped Tunisia’s policies since independence and continue to have an impact today.

Tunisia was the only country in the Arab world that embarked on a path to medium-term democratisation after the protests of 2011. The way the country managed the fall of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime, the transition to the transformation phase of 2012 to 2014 as well as the institutional achievements of the revolution have favoured Tunisia’s special position in the region: the Tunisisan constitution of 2014, which defines the civic-minded character of the state, is considered one of the most liberal in the region, despite some shortcomings.

Since his coup on 25 July 2021, President Kais Saied has gradually dismantled the separation of powers, the rule of law and the constitution. Key government institutions were either stripped of their powers or were put under the control of the president. After this crucial turning point in recent Tunisian history, there is now the looming threat of a consolidation phase, in which the authoritarian actions will be endorsed through questionable referenda and will thereby be regarded as a basis for legitimising a „new republic“ in the long term, perpetuating the current status quo.

The systematic dismantling of democratic achievements has not only paved the way for an autocratic Presidential system of government, but has also vindicated anti-democratic attitudes, populism and, more generally, all those who have been sceptical of the feasibility of democratic reforms in the entire Arab world. These domestic developments have been accompanied by an increasing suspicion against Europe and the West, harboured by many Tunisians, and by an increasingly critical attitude of government leaders vis-à-vis foreign countries and their representatives in Tunisia. Although the Tunisian government  is more than ever dependent on multilateral cooperation with foreign countries in view of the severe economic and financial crisis it is in, an ambivalent, inconsistent attitude towards fundamental Western values is gaining ground.

As a French-speaking country, Tunisia‘s interest is primarily focused on France, home of the largest Tunisian diaspora. However, the stain of being the former colonial power still hangs over France, whereas Germany, which is home to the third largest Tunisian diaspora, after France and Italy, tends to be viewed with less suspicion in this regard. What has contributed to this perception is the almost omnipresent German development cooperation and the considerable involvement of German companies in Tunisia, which have stayed in the country even in times of crisis. This positive attitude towards Germany can be identified especially in the educated, older demographic. Young Tunisians tend to be more sceptical about relations with Europe.

The government’s interest in cooperating with Germany and Europe is as high as ever. However, as a result of the authoritarian policies of President Saied, the traditionally close cooperation has noticeably changed. The sometimes harsh rhetoric used even vis-a-vis Tunisia’s most important international partners such as Europe and the US and the simultaneous stronger orientation towards Egypt, the Gulf states, Russia and China do not contribute to strengthening relations to the West.

Germany and Tunisia have maintained diplomatic relations since Tunisia’s independence in 1956. When the period  of democratisation began in 2011, this cooperation was expanded and deepened. Economic integration with Europe and Germany is high. Around two thirds of Tunisia’s foreign trade is carried out with the European Union, and the majority of foreign investments come from there. Germany ranks among the biggest foreign investors. In German foreign policy, Tunisia is considered to be the most important country for the German government’s transformation partnership with the Arab world. Tunisia concluded an Association Agreement with the EU in 1995, followed by the status of a privileged partnership (2012) and a free trade agreement (2015) as well as the Reform Partnership in 2017. Current priorities of German development cooperation are vocational training, development of the private sector and the financial system, good governance and reforms of the public sector, initiatives in the areas of renewable energy and energy efficiency as well as environmental protection and resource security. In view of the deepening economic crisis, the staggering public debt and the domestic developments of the past year, there is a risk, however, that many German and European initiatives in some areas will run out of steam.

Tunisia’s foreign policy, which insists on traditional neutrality, as it recently did when the question came up how close the country is to the major international powers (Ukraine conflict), is still in the constitutive phase: the debates on this issue focus, among other things, on expanding cooperation in the Maghreb, on how to handle actors like China, Russia, Turkey, Iran or Qatar that have all shown growing commitment in Tunisia and that are more important than ever as financial and economic partners, and on how to design the future relations to Europe.

The potential lying in a partnership with Germany must be assessed against the background of this diversification of relations. The economic integration of both countries will continue to be high, especially because Tunisia remains a comparatively attractive place to do business for German companies already based there, although many businesses have started avoiding Tunisia and investing in Morocco or even Egypt instead. Social integration will continue to increase, not least because of the influx of Tunisian skilled workers that Germany is encouraging.

However, the potential of intensifying a values-based partnership must be realistically assessed as a goal that is moving further away: reasons for this are the reform efforts that have been stalling for years, the disastrous economic and financial situation of Tunisia, political and social instability as well as the recent domestic developments, in the course of which most of the democratic achievements that had required major sacrifices have been replaced, for the time being, by authoritarian elements.

In the interest of maintaining and deepening German-Tunisian cooperation, there is an acute need for action, given the current negative trend.  The existing  relations need to be used more intensively for a dialogue on values and questions of governance. This dialogue must be managed transparently, respectfully, but also resolutely: in addition to foreign policy and public development cooperation, the soft power of German and Tunisian organisations should also be used to ensure that this kind of dialogue – but, even more importantly, Germany’s bilateral cooperation efforts as well, are not perceived as an assault on the country’s sovereignty. 

The response to the increasingly critical attitude of young Tunisians towards Germany should be more transparency in political decisions, and to gear cooperation more strongly to this population group. Part of this approach should be to target the growing (young) Tunisian diaspora who have ties to Germany because they lived there and whose experience with the country has been positive, in order to disseminate democratic values and build bridges between Germany and Tunisia as additional pillars of a values-based partnership. 

The dialogue on values should also not be based too much on topics that could be seen as expecting too much of religious conservatives and play into the hands of populist forces. Conveying an essentially (European) uniform concept of values, whose fundamental pillars – democracy, freedom, rule of law – are non-negotiable, should not and cannot be separated from the extensive achievements of European and German cooperation with Tunisia. In the context of a possible re-alignment of bilateral cooperation with Tunisia, the instrument of conditionality should not be dismissed out of hand, but should rather be carefully reviewed.

The new domestic political environment requires a clear identification and long-term strengthening of those actors who, as remaining “values partners“,  keep adhering to our fundamental values despite all (personal) risks and represent and defend these values. They act as resistance fighters against the authoritarian trends. It is necessary to build a credible counternarrative to the existing populist narrative of an opposition bloc controlled by foreign countries and serving their interests.

In view of the increasing number of international players in Tunisia, who represent values and policy agendas different from our own, more effort should be put into defining and communicating the comparative advantages of good relations with Germany to the Tunisian public.

Dr. Malte Gaier has headed the KAS office in Tunisia since August 2021.

Last update: 31 May 2022