JAPAN

Japan is one of Germany’s most important partners in values in the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries are closely linked, politically, economically and societally. In addition to their desire to work together to maintain and refine the multilateral, rule-based order, they hope to work even more closely together at a security policy level. Among the most important multilateral forums for cooperation with Japan, in addition to the G7 and G20, are the United Nations and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and also (with Japan as a Partner for Cooperation) the OSCE and NATO.

In 2020, the German government approved its Indo-Pacific Guidelines, which were instrumental in setting the course for German foreign policy in a region of growing geopolitical importance. Intensifying cooperation with Japan is a key element of this strategy. 

In view of the many threat situations in the Indo-Pacific region, whose political, economic and humanitarian repercussions would potentially spread as far as Europe, interaction at an institutional level is in both countries’ interests. Regular inter-governmental consultations will be held in future as a result.

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a current illustration of how important trusting and values-based partnerships are in terms of ensuring robust responses. Together with the G7 countries, Japan and Germany are the pillars supporting sanctions, humanitarian aid, and also the supply of protective equipment and weapons to Ukraine. Given their own war histories, both countries have a particular responsibility to make an active contribution toward peace, disarmament and rapprochement.

In times of increasing geopolitical uncertainties, Japan bases its security and defence policy on three pillars: Diplomacy, its bilateral security partnership with the US, and a reform of its Self-Defence Forces aimed at credible deterrence, a rapid response capability and a highly networked structure. Japan’s pursuit of these objectives is doubly restricted by a strongly pacifist security and defence policy, but it aims to increase its defence budget to more than two percent of GDP nonetheless. As an island nation that is highly industrialised but short on raw materials, and dependent on exports for its added value, Japan fundamentally relies on open seaways.

Top of the list of Japan’s perceived threats is therefore the military expansion by the People’s Republic of China in the East China and South China Seas, especially given the highly non-transparent nature of China’s military strategy, the country’s constantly growing defence budget, and the technological advances it has made in recent years in electronic warfare. A second serious threat to Japan is the active expansion of North Korea’s missile programmes, and a third relates to increasing Russian military activity on Japan’s northern periphery. Russia has postponed negotiations on a peace treaty with Japan indefinitely. The territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands is thus highly topical. And that is not all: Russia has announced it intends to occupy and develop part of the islands. The entire area around the South and East China Seas is thus a potential source of military conflicts.

For these reasons Japan is heavily dependent on reliable security and alliance-based partnerships. In addition to its close defence-policy collaborations with the US and Australia, the EU – and thus also Germany – is increasingly on Japan’s radar. In its Indo-Pacific Guidelines, Germany put itself forward as a key partner. This was followed by the first 2+2 discussions between Japan and Germany, and the frigate ‘Bayern’ was sent for joint manoeuvres and to monitor UN sanctions against North Korea. A start has therefore been made on both sides toward increased cooperation. In addition, during the 2+2 talks, Japan expressed a desire to include Germany in future naval manoeuvres. 

In March 2021, Japan and Germany also signed the Japanese-German Agreement on the Security of Information. This agreement enables confidential information to be shared between authorities and businesses in the two partner countries. It also allows for enhanced cooperation in defence technology and in questions of space and cyberspace.

Germany and Japan still lack high-level institutional formats. The 2+2 talks have been held only once thus far, but government consultations at a ministerial level have only been considered at this stage. The trip by the German Chancellor to Japan in April 2022 showed that Japan is high on Germany’s foreign-policy agenda. Japan will now observe very closely the level of determination shown by the new German government in pursuing its promising initiatives. The Russian aggression against Ukraine illustrates the value of reliable, values-based partnerships. The “new era” that has been proclaimed in Germany can only start in collaboration with other strong, like-minded nations. 

Clear parameters and goals for cooperation, separate from those of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines, have been put in place in the form of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between Japan and the EU, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Connectivity Partnership. The process of implementing these agreements, however, is still only in its initial stages, partly owing to Covid-19.

There is major potential for Japan in this area, and also a need, considering the threat scenarios discussed above. Both countries meet the preconditions for a more in-depth relationship in the form of Declarations of Intent and the agreements that have been concluded. In addition, the Merkel cabinet set the course for German commitment in the Indo-Pacific region with the Indo-Pacific Guidelines. Japan expects the new federal government to continue its key role in the Indo-Pacific. From Japan’s perspective, both countries have a special position in the free world, and Japan is prepared to enter into a stronger bilateral relationship.

In addition to Russia, China also poses a growing challenge for both Japan and Germany. The economic interrelationships between both export-driven economies and China are comparably close, and comparably awkward if regional conflicts were to arise. “Decoupling” is a goal for both Japan and Germany in equal measure. The security policy exigencies therefore go hand in hand with opportunities for greater economic cooperation. Both countries have committed to sustainability and climate-neutrality and are performing in-depth research into alternative, green forms of energy, and can – for example – successfully compete with China’s power of innovation only by working together. At an economic strategy level, too, Japan is becoming an important partner in efforts to better offset disruptions in the supply chains for key technologies.

The Indo-Pacific Guidelines are expressly designed for broad-based cooperation, in the areas of digitalisation, networking, cyber, and also visionary, future-oriented technologies, for example.

Political and economic developments in Asia are the drivers of growth, well-being and progress for us all. As the continent holding the most promise for the future, Asia should therefore occupy an even stronger position in Germany’s foreign, security and economic policy. Germany, and also the EU, are competing with China, the US, Australia and India for trade agreements, talents, innovation and investments. Although the Indo-Pacific Guidelines take account of these factors, now is the time to underpin them with specific, long-term projects. 

And to be relevant to Japan as a security partner, Germany needs to feel a genuine sense of obligation toward the Indo-Pacific region. Specific areas within a very broad-based strategy should be prioritised, and regular interaction with a range of players at various levels should be initiated. The paradigm shift in defence policy in Germany was very positively received in Japan. Thus, for example, upgrading the Bundeswehr, boosting the defence budget and the plans for energy independence are definitely blueprints for Japan, where they are being very positively received. This is where it pays to have closely dovetailed interaction between the relevant government departments and offers of discussions with Japan. 

Ultimately, both Japan and Germany are medium-sized powers with a degree of influence, although not decisive influence, on global developments. Both countries attribute their success to a strategic (and also pragmatic) balancing of interests and objectives between various partners. In times of systemic rivalries and growing bipolarisation, strategic collaboration between medium-sized powers is all the more important. The quality of the transatlantic relationship can improve or worsen in future, depending on who is President. The pragmatic relationship with China could take a sudden turn if Taiwan is made a province of China by force. Germany – ideally together with Japan, its partner in values – must deal with these consequences in specific terms, acknowledge its own leadership responsibilities within Europe and do them justice.

Rabea Brauer heads the KAS Country Programme Japan and the Regional Programme “Social Economic Policies” in Asia, based in Tokyo.