ALGERIA

As the largest country in Africa in terms of land area, linking the MENA region and the Sahel zone and as an immediate neighbour, Algeria has a natural relevance for Germany and Europe. The army enjoys a high status as an institution and defense spending is stable at 6% of GDP.

Algeria cooperates intensively with the countries of the region on security issues, either within the framework of the respective bilateral relations or via regional mechanisms, such as the Nouakchott Process of the African Union (AU), which supports the security policy cooperation of eleven states in West Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.

In the Maghreb, Algeria sometimes sees itself as a kind of “big brother” to Tunisia, one who stabilises Tunisia politically and in terms of security and economic policy. This self-assessment is partly justified in that Algeria has repeatedly supported its smaller neighbour in crisis situations. Algeria’s relations with Morocco, on the other hand, are extremely tense. Rabat and Algiers are divided by the conflict over the status of the Morocco-occupied Western Sahara and by border disputes that stem from the French colonial era. Against this backdrop, a stronger Algerian commitment to the AU’s security architecture, which has become more apparent recently, should be interpreted primarily as a message to the Western rival and underscores the new Algerian self-image of a regional power that is determined to bring its weight to bear under certain circumstances.

Since gaining independence from France in 1962, the country has seen itself as a key player in the Non-Aligned Movement and provided support for the anti-colonial liberation movements in Africa until the 1980s. In this way, Algeria developed a special reputation in the so-called “Global South”. The diplomatic credibility resulting from this means that the country is a potentially influential mediator in the region’s conflicts.

The fundamental aim of Algeria’s foreign and security policy is to maintain national independence and follows the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Algeria is therefore extremely critical of initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of the EU or the German Reform Partnership for Africa, as it perceives them to be interfering in Algeria’s internal affairs, particularly with respect to agreements for implementing a political reform agenda. In the case of Algeria, the rejection of any external interference is not only an instrument employed by the elites to isolate themselves from external criticism, but also reflects a basic social consensus, shared even by citizens who are critical of the regime.

The breaking off of diplomatic relations with Spain is an example of Algeria’s uncompromising stance. Spain had surprisingly supported Morocco’s position in the Western Sahara conflict. 

Nevertheless, the country is interested in economic cooperation with Germany. The country’s tense economic situation and the reform agenda of President Abdelmajid Tebboune, who was elected at the end of 2019, could lead to a cautious opening for further offers of cooperation.

Only since the November 2020 constitutional reform, has the Algerian army been allowed to participate in peace-keeping operations in other countries in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations, the AU and the Arab League. As a general principle, however, Algeria rejects military intervention by other countries in third countries. As a result, the country is sceptical about military operations such as the French engagement in Mali, in which Germany is also heavily involved.

However, the example of Mali also shows that Algeria deviates from its basic principles if its own interests are directly threatened: the country opened its airspace to the French Air Force in order to allow France to take military action against Islamist forces that had taken control of northern Mali and that were also responsible for an attack on Algerian gas production facilities near In Anémas.

Based on its own experience of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, in which some 200,000 people died, the country is anxious to resist the emergence and spread of jihadist forces in Algeria, and it will therefore continue to be involved in the international fight against terrorism.

Although Algeria is only marginally present in Germany’s political debate, the country is recognised for its role in the international fight against terrorism and for its initiatives toward security policy stabilisation in the Sahel region. The country is seen as a potential mediator in conflict situations.

As part of the so-called “Berlin Process”, which the German Federal Government, in cooperation with the United Nations, initiated in September 2019 to end the conflict in Libya, Algeria was involved as one of the few countries that were regarded as a credible partner without vested interests on Libyan soil. The military, however, was prepared to intervene as soon as Algerian security was no longer guaranteed.

In view of the above challenges, the potential for foreign and security policy cooperation between Germany and Algeria is considerable and is viewed as significant by both sides. Putting it into practice, however, will not be easy.

Cooperation with Algeria on the basis of Algeria’s self-image as a mediating power in the region is possible in principle, but it will keep encountering difficulties in practical political coordination if initiatives are perceived as being led from outside. This is illustrated by the French-led G5-Sahel initiative, which is intended to enable five Sahel states to deal with the region’s security policy challenges. Algeria basically supports the goals of the initiative but is very sceptical about the French position and would prefer a stronger role for the AU.

In the broader international context, Algeria will not commit itself to a partnership with the western community of states and will continue to maintain close relationships with countries such as Russia, and increasingly also China. Algiers appreciates the fact that these players do not pursue any normative objectives, at least from the Algerian perspective, in their relations with third countries apart from the specific issues relevant to these relations as such.

Since February 2019, there were mass protests against the government, which gained new momentum in late 2020 after a pandemic-induced lull and which have not died down even though key figures have been arrested. Parliamentary elections in June 2021 were a disappointment. Only 23% of all eligible voters exercised their right to vote. The position the new government, which mainly includes members of the old government parties and independent candidates, is going to take on domestic issues is also relevant for foreign policy developments. Germany should observe these developments, but should refrain from commenting on them for now. There should be no open interference –not even by issuing statements– in Algerian domestic politics, at least as long as the political conflict continues to stay largely non-violent.

For Algeria, it is very important to operate internationally on an equal footing with countries like Germany. In order to benefit from the country’s potential as a mediator in the region, Algeria should be involved from an early stage in German initiatives such as the Berlin Process. Germany should also keep track of Algerian initiatives in the region and possibly provide them with political support. To this end, Germany could seek regular and closer exchanges of information with Algeria regarding the situation in the region and should highlight this approach in communicating with its European partners, of whom France in particular is very active in North Africa and the Sahel.

Michael Bauer was policy advisor for the Middle East and North Africa in the European and International Cooperation Department.
Holger Dix headed the KAS Office in Tunisia / Algeria from January 2017 until July 2021.

Last update: May 11, 2022